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Abstract: 
This paper evaluates the relative efficiency of a sample of 37 large pharmaceutical laboratories in the 
period 2008-2013 using a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach. We describe in detail the 
procedure followed to select and construct relevant inputs and outputs that characterize the production 
and innovation activity of these pharmaceutical firms. Models are estimated with financial information 
from Datastream, including R&D investment, and the number of new drugs authorized by the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA) and the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) considering the time 
effect. The relative performances of these firms –taking into consideration the strategic importance of 
R&D– suggest that the pharmaceutical industry is a highly competitive sector given that there are many 
laboratories at the efficient frontier and many inefficient laboratories close to this border. Additionally, 
we use data from S&P Capital IQ to analyze 2,071 financial transactions announced by our sample of 
laboratories as an alternative way to gain access to new drugs, and we link these transactions with R&D 
investment and DEA efficiency. We find that efficient laboratories make on average more financial 
transactions, and the relative size of each transaction is larger. However, pharmaceutical companies 
that simultaneously are more efficient and invest more internally in R&D announce smaller transactions 
relative to total assets. 
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1. Introduction. 
Managing a research and development (R&D) portfolio of new drugs in the pipeline is a challenging task 
that involves an active selection and reallocation of resources. In order to be efficient, pharmaceutical 
laboratories should decide upon strategic issues regarding the laboratory size, internal and external growth 
options and synergies, and diversity of innovative drugs in each therapeutic area. This decision making 
should take into consideration the R&D strategies of their competitors.   
In this regard, large pharmaceutical laboratories have two nonexclusive alternatives for managing their 
portfolio of new drugs in an efficient way. They may develop new drugs internally, but simultaneously they 
may also engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) –or other financial transactions– to obtain new drugs 
or to change the composition of their portfolio of promising drugs (sometimes simultaneously selling new 
drugs and buying other types of new drugs); see figure 1. 
******************************************************************* 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
******************************************************************* 
Thus, the market for technology is a way to both acquire and sell knowledge [3] either through collaboration 
(co-research, co-development or other collaborations), licensing or (and) trough financial transactions. 
Nishimura and Okada [47] examine how R&D portfolios of Japanese pharma labs affect licensing decisions 
(license out and inward licensing). They observe drug pipelines quite accurately due to the rigorous 
regulatory process of clinical testing. They conclude that drug pipelines may dictate a licensing decision as 
a result of portfolio adjustment across different stages.  
A second alternative to buy (and also sell) knowledge is through financial transactions. In this paper, we 
measure relative efficiency of pharmaceutical labs and then perform several regressions to test whether 
efficient labs announce more or less financial transactions than inefficient labs in order to realign their R&D 
portfolios.  
To the best of our knowledge, regarding the measurement of efficiency of pharma labs, the only 
contribution similar to this paper is the one by Shimura et al. [52], where large pharmaceutical firms are 
categorized into four groups (on the basis of their respective R&D efficiency) and two dimensions (one 
based on DEA efficiency scores and the other based on effectiveness scores) in order to analyze R&D 
productivity.  They consider new molecular entities from 21 global pharmaceutical companies in the period 
2002-2007 from a database provided by Barclays capital. However, many new drugs in the pipeline do not 
reach Phase III and some drugs reach it faster than others, so the R&D activity of a pharmaceutical 
laboratory is composed of both successful and unsuccessful drugs. These authors account for this by 
considering R&D expenditure and net present value. 
The DEA efficient frontier in our output-oriented model comprises laboratories that perform better than 
others. A laboratory in the sample is efficient, given its inputs, if it is not possible to find a linear 
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combination of laboratories in the sample having the same inputs and yielding higher outputs. In our case, 
we use information about successful new drugs from medicines authorized by the EMA and the FDA but 
in our models we also consider financial information from Datastream, aiming to take into consideration 
both short-term and long-term indicators of the success of R&D activity. So, accounting information, 
market information, and data about new authorized drugs are combined in our DEA efficiency models. In 
the case of new authorized drugs, we take the time effect into account in a more precise manner. We focus 
exclusively on DEA efficiency scores, and our objective is to extract as much information as possible from 
them. 
Regarding internal and external R&D activity, Comanor and Scherer [16] indicate that, in response to 
lagging innovation, some companies have sought refuge in M&As. Shimura et al. [52] in their 2002 to 2007 
sample, showed that companies with lower R&D relative to efficiency were more likely to engage in 
consolidation. 
Higgins and Rodriguez [32] focus on the acquisition of knowledge by examining the performance of 160 
pharmaceutical acquisitions from 1994 to 2001 and find that on average acquirers realize significant 
positive returns. These returns are positively correlated with prior acquirer access to information about the 
R&D activities at target firms and a superior negotiating position. They also find that firms experiencing 
declines in internal productivity or which are more desperate are more likely to engage in an outsourcing-
type acquisition in an effort to replenish their research pipelines. 
Girotra et al. [26] indicate that value of an R&D project depends not only on its properties but also on the 
other R&D projects being developed by the pharma lab. They conduct an event study around the failure of 
phase III clinical trials and their effect on the market valuation of the lab. They find that the presence of 
other R&D projects targeting the same market and a build-up of projects that require the same development 
resources reduce the value of an R&D project. 
Hagedoorn and Wang [31], using a panel sample of 83 incumbent pharmaceutical firms during the period 
1986-2000, find that internal R&D and external R&D, through either R&D alliances or R&D acquisitions 
are complementary innovation activities at higher levels of in-house R&D investments, whereas at lower 
levels of in-house R&D efforts, internal and external R&D turn out to be substitutive strategic options. 
Kang et al. [38] show that external technology acquisition has an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
subsequent technology innovation performance, and that is not complementary to internal R&D activities. 
Bena and Li [7], using a large sample of acquirers with patents and targets with patents over the period 
1984 to 2006, focus on corporate innovation activity as a source of synergy. They find that firms with large 
patent portfolios and low R&D expenses are more likely to be acquirers, while R&D-intensive firms with 
slow growth in patent output are more likely to be acquired. Also, technological overlap between firms’ 
innovation activities has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of a merger pair formation. The 
likelihood of a merger is reduced for firm pairs that also overlap in product markets. Finally, they show a 
positive treatment effect of a merger on post-merger innovation output when there is premerger 
technological overlap between merging firms. They conclude that synergies obtained from combining 
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innovation capabilities are an important motivation for corporate acquisitions. The findings of their paper 
suggest several new directions for future research and they mention first that their paper highlights that 
many merger transactions are driven by efficiency motives.  
Our paper tries to contribute to previous literature relating lab efficiency as a whole to internal and external 
R&D strategies. The novelty of our approach is that we consider large laboratories from different countries 
and, simultaneously, we combine in a novel way alternative sources of data –Datastream, the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA) and the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)– to select and construct 
relevant inputs and outputs that characterize the production and innovation activity of large pharmaceutical 
companies. Previous papers have estimated either DEA efficiency or DEA total factor productivity of 
pharmaceutical laboratories, but most of them consider laboratories from a single country [27, 33, 43] or 
consider innovation in several countries but the unit analyzed is not the pharmaceutical laboratory but the 
country itself [29, 50].  
In addition, when measuring R&D efficiency of either countries or pharmaceutical firms, most previous 
papers consider the number of patents as a proxy for R&D output [19, 30, 37]. In our study, as a proxy for 
R&D output we consider not only the number of new chemical entities (excluding generics) approved by 
the EMA and the FDA for each laboratory, but also we adjust this figure considering the specific date of 
authorization of each approved medicine. Although studies considering patents adjust for the quality of 
patents by considering the number of times that a patent has been cited, in our case only the most successful 
new drugs in the pharmaceutical pipeline (after a successful Phase III evaluation) are approved by the EMA 
and/or the FDA, so we consider this measure to be a better proxy for successful R&D than patents. 
We consider a common efficiency frontier for large pharmaceutical firms irrespective of their country of 
origin given that they compete with each other when trying to obtain new drug authorizations from the 
EMA and/or the FDA. Also, firms with authorized medicines sell the same chemical entities in many 
different countries, and global investors in the pharmaceutical sector analyze the big laboratories’ returns 
and risks when deciding on portfolio weight and diversification issues. So pharmaceutical companies are 
global in several dimensions. 
After dropping laboratories with any missing values, we end up with a final sample of 37 large firms. If 
these are compared with the Datastream sample of 241 companies, our sample accounts for more than 80% 
of market value, net sales and net income. Thus, we believe that our 37-laboratory sample is significantly 
representative of the pharmaceutical industry.  
This article aims to measure first the relative efficiency of a sample of 37 large pharmaceutical laboratories 
from different countries, which can be considered representative of this industry, in the period 2008-2013 
using a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) non-parametric approach. Our results suggest that the 
pharmaceutical industry is a competitive sector with many laboratories at the efficient frontier and many 
inefficient laboratories close to the frontier. Then, we split our sample into efficient labs and inefficient labs 
and we analyze in detail financial transactions announced by efficient and inefficient labs. 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes efficiency measurement in pharma labs, section 3 
discusses DEA efficiency results, and section 4 analyzes M&A as well as other announced transactions by 
efficient and inefficient pharmaceutical laboratories. Conclusions are drawn and suggestions for future 
research are given in section 5. 
 
2. Efficiency measurement in pharmaceutical firms.  
The development of a globalized economy has led to a new environment, in which international 
competitiveness has become fierce and where the concept of ‘efficiency’ has become strategically 
important. The pharmaceutical sector, in which R&D is key, is no exception and competition in it has 
increased dramatically. So, given the importance of this industry from both the political-economic and the 
ethical-healthcare points of view, this paper aims, as a first stept, to measure the efficiency of large 
pharmaceutical firms. 
The pharmaceutical industry is very important not only in health terms but also in economic terms, so it is 
relevant to study its internal and external R&D activity at both industry and laboratory level, and from the 
perspectives of public [9] and private funding of R&D. In addition, pharmaceutical companies have 
engaged in R&D collaboration not only with other laboratories but also with other firms and universities 
[45]. According to the IMS Institute [35], spending on medicines will reach nearly 1.3 trillion USD in 2018. 
This would mean an average annual growth of 6% over the period 2009-2018. The pharmaceutical industry 
is therefore a key sector. Few other industries can match its contribution to investment in R&D, trade 
balance, and creation of skilled employment.  
Nonetheless, this sector faces major challenges in the current context. In addition to regulatory hurdles and 
escalating R&D costs, it has been severely hit by the impact of fiscal austerity measures. How 
pharmaceutical companies –and related stakeholders– approach these problems may impact both the 
worldwide economy and the future health of the world population.  
In this concentrated industry, the ten largest pharmaceutical laboratories represent approximately one third 
of the global market. Six of them are from the US, while the remaining four are from Europe. A study by 
the IMS Institute [34] highlights that, although there has been rapid growth in emerging economies (such 
as Brazil, China, and India), North America and Europe currently account for more than 50% of global 
spending, which justifies the use of the EMA and the FDA in this study.  
Regarding the analysis of efficiency in the pharmaceutical sector, most of the literature has centered on 
Asian countries. One of the earliest studies was by Honjo and Haneda [33], who analyzed the efficiency of 
fourteen Japanese pharmaceutical firms over the period 1977-1991 with a DEA model comprising one input 
and two outputs.  
You et al. [59] measured the efficiency of pharmaceutical firms and identified their determinants using 
Korean and American samples. They used four different types of efficiency (cost, allocative, technical and 
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scale) based on DEA and, by means of regression techniques, studied the impact of ownership structure, 
R&D investment, and scale economies. Mao et al. [43] evaluated the business performance of thirty-four 
Chinese pharmaceutical companies using DEA. They considered three inputs (size of the workforce, 
administrative expenses, and gross assets), and one output (operating revenue). This study concluded that 
the overall efficiency of this sector in China was not high. Other studies have used this methodology to rate 
pharmaceutical firms in India [44] and Iran [36]. 
In this sector, innovation is of special importance from a health perspective, so the importance of R&D 
should be considered in the analysis. Wang and Huang [56] evaluated the relative efficiency of R&D 
activities across countries. These authors used patents and academic publications as outputs. Hashimoto 
and Haneda [30] focused on the R&D efficiency of pharmaceutical companies in Japan and considered that 
the efficiency frontier shifted over time. As an input, they used R&D expenditure and considered three 
outputs: patents (as a proxy of invention), pharmaceutical sales (as a proxy of product innovation), and 
operating profit (as a proxy of process innovation). Shimura et al. [52] used one input (R&D expenditure) 
and three outputs (sales, operating profit, and the accumulated number of weighted new molecular entities 
approved by the Japanese Ministry of Health) to measure R&D productivity. Cruz-Cáceres et al. [19] 
discussed the relationship between innovation and performance and proposed a new approach to tackle it, 
using R&D capital stock and highly-skilled staff as innovation inputs, and new products and patents as 
innovation outputs. 
2.1. DEA optimization technique. 
A company’s business efficiency can be defined as the relation between the value created and the resources 
used for creating it [6]. It is a broad term that can be assessed by considering a single ratio or by means of 
several inputs to consider resources employed and outputs to express value creation. 
When measuring the efficiency of a company, the literature offers a wide variety of alternatives for inputs 
and outputs depending on the authors’ approach. A general pattern does exist, however. Input variables 
tend to represent investment metrics, both tangible –such as number of employees, number of branches, 
and administrative expenses [58]– and intangible –like product and process knowledge [2]. On the other 
hand, output variables are generally key performance indicators, both in absolute –such as profit, market 
share, and market value [55]– and in relative terms –like profit ratio, return on assets, and B/M ratio [57].  
Under these circumstances, DEA is a common approach for studying business efficiency. Cooper et al. [18] 
define DEA as a “data oriented approach for evaluating the performance of a set of peer entities that convert 
multiple inputs into multiple outputs” (see section 3.1 for a detailed description). For this reason, this 
technique has been used to measure relative efficiency in different kinds of entities, such as hospitals [11, 
41], universities [51], retail stores [55], banks [58], airports [48], holdings [57], and sport teams [24].  
Figure 2 outlines the approach followed for assessing the efficiency of pharmaceutical companies. It is 
mainly based on a four-step process. The first one is the study of strategic issues –the pharmaceutical sector 
(and its distinctive features) and DEA-based techniques. The second one aims to determine how efficiency 
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must be measured in this environment. Note that DEA allows the efficiency of companies to be measured 
from a multidimensional perspective, so several inputs and outputs are defined. The third one is the 
construction of the DEA model under two different assumptions: constant returns-to-scale (CRS) and 
variable returns-to-scale (VRS). In the last step, results are analyzed from a double perspective. On the one 
hand, the efficiency of a relevant sample of the world’s leading pharmaceutical companies is evaluated, 
which is the main goal of the paper. On the other hand, the peers, i.e. references at the frontier for inefficient 
firms, are discussed.  
Additionally, and as intermediate steps in the evaluation process, data, results, and consistency must be 
checked. Data are checked to verify that the DEA model can operate with the defined combination of inputs 
and outputs (e.g. with non-negative values, or with constraints in the available data), while results are 
checked to study the representativeness of the solutions. Finally, consistency is checked to ensure that the 
results are sufficient to draw conclusions, so a number of models are created. For reasons of space, in this 
paper we only discuss the three final models. The whole process was carried out during five months, with 
weekly meetings of an interdisciplinary group of five people, some of them experts in the methodology and 
others with proven knowledge of this sector. 
******************************************************************* 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
******************************************************************* 
In the original study by Charnes et al. [13], DEA is described as a “mathematical programming model 
applied to observational data that provides a new way of obtaining empirical estimates of relations –such 
as the production functions and/or efficient production possibility surfaces– that are cornerstones of modern 
economics”.  
DEA is a non-parametric frontier-efficiency method using a linear programming technique for measuring 
performance. It assesses the relative efficiency of a set of decision making units (DMUs), pharmaceutical 
laboratories in this study, that are engaged in performing a similar function using a set of inputs (related to 
investment by the firms) to produce a set of outputs (indicators of their performance). When a DMU 
maximizes the relationship between outputs and inputs, it is located on the frontier, and is regarded as an 
efficient unit (100%). If not, the relative efficiency of the DMU is measured in the interval (0%, 100%) 
subject to the absolute efficiency of the DMUs on the frontier, which reveals that this efficiency could be 
improved by changing the proportion among inputs. Subsequently, the DMUs can summarize the 
quantitative index of overall efficiency and hence can be ranked by scale. 
DEA has been widely used by researchers in a number of fields for modeling operational processes for 
performance evaluations, in governmental and nonprofit sectors and in regulated and private sectors. These 
multiple applications were supported by further development by Zhu [60], who tested a number of DEA 
models that can be used in performance evaluation and frontier estimation.  
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DEA can be carried out under the assumption of CRS or VRS –i.e. by introducing a scale constraint in the 
model, hence DMUs are not penalized for operating at a non-optimal scale [4].  
Under the VRS approach, the CCR model (from the CRS approach) [13] becomes the BCC model if the 
convexity constraint is added. This classic DEA-based model in its output-oriented form to measure 
efficiency is formulated by (1), where n is the number of DMUs (general index i, while l is the index of the 
specific DMU whose efficiency is being assessed), m is the number of inputs (general index j), p is the 
number of outputs (general index k), �௜ are the multipliers used for computing linear combinations of the 
DMU’s inputs and outputs (i.e. the model’s decision variables), ݔ௜௝  is the observed amount of input j of 
DMU i, and ݕ௜௞ is the observed amount of output k of DMU i. Note that �∗ refers to the optimal efficiency 
score of a DMU. That is, if �∗ = ͳ, DMU l is technically efficient. Note that both the CCR and the BCC 
models are radial projection constructs for characterizing efficiency, unlike other models such as non-radial 
ADD [14]. Finally, both models are invariant to the units of measurement. 
Maximize: �∗ = max � 
(1) 
Subject to: ∑ �௜ݔ௜௝ ൑ ݔ௟௝ ; ݂݋ݎ ݆ = ͳ,ʹ, … , ݉�௜=ଵ  ∑ �௜ݕ௜௞ ൒ �ݕ௟௞; ݂݋ݎ ݇ = ͳ,ʹ, … , ݌�௜=ଵ  ∑ �௜ = ͳ; ݂݋ݎ ݅ = ͳ,ʹ, … , ݊�௜=ଵ  �௜ ൒ Ͳ; ݂݋ݎ ݅ = ͳ,ʹ, … , ݊ 
 
The work by Barr [5] can be consulted to decide between the technological choices that are currently 
available to implement DEA. In order to estimate relative efficiencies under the standard CRS and VRS 
models we used the DEAP software developed by Professor Tim Coelli. In particular, to solve the linear 
programming problems this study used DEAP 2.1 software [15], which is also valid for computing 
Malmquist DEA, i.e. for calculating indices of total factor productivity (TFP). 
Some studies estimate Malmquist productivity indexes (TFP indexes) using DEA and break them down 
into sources of productivity change. We did not calculate TFP given that a data set with no missing values 
is needed in all the relevant years (from 2008 to 2013 in our case). The Malmquist productivity index was 
introduced by Caves et al. [12] as the ratio of two distance functions pertaining to distinct time periods. 
There are several alternative ways to compute TFP. For a discussion and for an empirical example applied 
to pharmaceutical laboratories in Spain, see [27]. For a study on the dynamics of technological innovation, 
see [1]. 
2.2. Data selection and DMUs. 
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This research uses data within the 2008-2013 time period obtained from three main sources: the FDA, the 
EMA, and Datastream. The FDA and the EMA are responsible for protecting and promoting public health 
in the US (the former) and the EU (the latter) through the regulation and supervision of medicines. They 
require that each new medicine is evaluated through various phases of clinical trials. Both agencies maintain 
a historical database with all medicines approved1. Data was also taken from Datastream, a global financial 
and macroeconomic database.  
Initially, we focused on a list of 241 large pharmaceutical laboratories taken from Datastream (TR 
GLOBAL PHARMA list) and generated on 4th June 2014. All financial information from large laboratories 
from different countries was generated in USD.  
We then identified the Datastream constituents with financial information in the study period 2008-2013 
and computed an average for each of the financial variables considered over the study period. We chose an 
average in order to deal with possible missing values in any given year for specific laboratories. We also 
considered the sum of all values for each variable (instead of the average) with no significant changes in 
efficiency estimates. 
Subsequently, we searched for Datastream laboratories with new chemical entities approved by the EMA 
and FDA during the study period (at least one drug authorized in the period 2008 to 2013 by EMA or FDA). 
Our final sample is made up of 37 pharmaceutical laboratories, which are the DMUs in our research, with 
full Datastream information and also with new drugs approved by the EMA and/or FDA in the period 2008-
2013. 
Given that there were 241 pharmaceutical laboratories in the original Datastream list and that a balanced 
data set with no missing values in any of the variables is needed in order to estimate DEA relative 
efficiencies, two important issues must be taken into account in order to try to assure that our final sample 
of 37 laboratories represents the large pharmaceutical sector. 
The first is to know if the economic activity of our sample of 37 large laboratories represents a large 
proportion of the total activity of the pharmaceutical laboratory sector. The second is related to the absence 
of a time dimension in our DEA model because a time dimension is only included in our DEA analysis 
when discounting the number of days that a new drug has been authorized.  
To address both issues, we compared the market capitalization, net sales, and net income of the Datastream 
list of 241 laboratories versus those of the final 37 laboratories year by year. Our 37 laboratories were seen 
to represent 80% of the market value of the 241 laboratories, and similar figures were obtained for net sales 
and net income. Thus, this analysis suggests that our 37 laboratories represent a large proportion of the 
large pharmaceutical companies’ economic activity. However, the time effect over the period 2008 to 2013 
                                                          
1
 Large pharmaceutical companies operate globally, so they market their innovative drugs in more markets than Europe 
and the USA. Thus, our measure for innovative drugs that have been authorized by the EMA and the FDA for a given 
laboratory is a proxy for the expected authorization of the same innovative drug for other markets. Europe and USA 
are two key markets, and an innovative drug can be expected to be innovative in all the relevant markets. Given that 
laboratories operate globally, we consider our proxy to be a good one. 
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shows that laboratories excluded from the 37 gained increasing importance in terms of creating value, 
increasing sales and increasing net profit. The details are shown in Table A.1 of Appendix A. 
Given that the number of new drugs authorized by the EMA [22] or the FDA [23] per year is very small, 
we accounted for the aggregate number of drugs authorized to each laboratory over the whole period 2008 
to 2013. It must be stressed that we only consider innovative drugs, i.e. generic drugs are NOT taken into 
consideration and are totally excluded from our analysis. If we had considered new drugs authorized per 
year, we would have had to rule out additional laboratories every time they had no authorized new drugs in 
a given year and we would not have been able to compute the DEA efficiencies at the year level for such 
laboratories.  
2.3. Description of variables: Inputs and outputs. 
In this non-parametric DEA approach aimed at measuring the relative efficiency of pharmaceutical 
laboratories, we used different combinations of inputs and outputs in order to measure the performance of 
the laboratories and applied sensitivity techniques to verify the consistency of the results. This selection of 
the inputs and outputs of the model is a key part of a DEA study. The larger the number of inputs and 
outputs, the less discriminatory the model becomes. Boussofiane et al. [8] stated that, as a rule of thumb, in 
most situations satisfactory discrimination is obtained if the number of units in the assessment set (DMUs) 
is three times the number of inputs times the number of outputs. Cooper et al. [17] uphold that the number 
of DMUs should be at least three times higher than the number of inputs and outputs. The more inputs and 
ouputs included in a DEA model, the higher the relative efficiency and the higher the number of laboratories 
that are likely to be at the efficient frontier. There should be a balance between including all relevant inputs 
and outputs and being able to differentiate between efficient and inefficient labs. 
Seven variables were used in the final models to measure the business efficiency of large pharmaceutical 
firms in the period 2008-2013. Three of them were considered inputs, and another three outputs. The 
remaining one was considered both an input and an output in different models as it may be understood 
either way.  
The inputs (I1, I2, I3) represent proxies of the investment in innovation by the pharmaceutical firms:  
- Size of the workforce (I1-SW). This refers to the average number of employees in the company (including 
all the business functions) in the above-mentioned period.  
- Total assets (I2-TA). This is expressed as the average assets (land cost, building cost, inventory, machine 
and equipment, and so forth) of the company in the above-mentioned period, which represent a measure of 
the total size of the company. 
- Investment in R&D (I3-IRD). This is the average expenditure by the company on R&D from 2008 to 2013.  
The outputs (O1, O2, O3) are common indicators, related to the firms’ main goals:  
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- Net profit (O1-NP). This variable considers the average net results (i.e. after depreciation, amortization, 
interest, and tax) in the period 2008-2013. 
- Market capitalization (O2-MC). This refers to the average market value of the company from 2008 to 
2013. Unlike the previous variable, this one takes into account not only the company’s current results, but 
also its expectations for the future2. 
- Total sales (O3-TS). This is expressed as the average sales of the company within the above-mentioned 
time period and contains information on one of the key indicators in companies, market share. 
Many of our 37 laboratories have zero drugs authorized in a given year and DEA requires a balanced data 
set in order to compute the frontier and estimate relative efficiencies. Given that we take averages for 
financial data, we also had to add up all the new drugs during the period. One simple alternative would 
have been to directly consider the number of new chemical entities authorized by EMA and/or FDA during 
the study period from 2008 to 2013. However, it is not the same to have a new drug authorized at the 
beginning of the study period (generating cash flow during the whole period) than at the end of the study 
period. We show in Table A.2 of Appendix A the evolution over time of new drugs authorized by EMA 
and/or FDA. We also show the accumulated number of days until 31st December 2013 and the number of 
days discounted. To account for this time effect, we computed a new variable that we define below. 
In any case, it is striking from our authorized drug sample summarized in Table A.2 that the number of new 
drugs authorized by the EMA, in any of the years between 2008 and 2013, is higher than the number of 
new drugs authorized by the FDA. We carefully double-checked our database and, to the best of our 
knowledge, we believe that the authorized drug information has been extracted correctly. Thus, our 
interpretation of the available data is related to the fact that there is not a clear-cut difference between a 
really new chemical entity and a generic drug. There is a grey zone in between for drugs that are not a 
radical innovation but an incremental innovation. This may explain why in Table A.2 of the appendix, the 
EMA has more authorized new drugs than the FDA. The EMA database includes generic and non-generic 
drugs and provides a field named “generic”, while the FDA separates new chemical entities from the rest. 
As mentioned above, one variable is considered both an input and an output: 
- Number of days of authorized innovative medicines considering the time effect (I4/O4-NDAIMCTE). A 
simple approach for considering new authorized drugs in the analysis would have been just to count the 
number of authorized drugs per laboratory during our study period. However, we wished to take into 
account the time effect. Thus, NDAIMCTE  refers to the number of days that each innovative medicine has 
been authorized in the US and in the EU until the end of the period (or until the date of removal, if the 
                                                          
2
 Market capitalization is the result of a consensus in the market about current cash flows and expected future cash 
flows. In the case of pharmaceutical labs, it takes into account innovative drugs that are in the pipeline but have not yet 
been authorized because they are in the different phases of clinical research (Phase I, Phase II, Phase III), as well as 
some innovative drugs that have been authorized but are still in postmarketing surveillance (Phase IV). 
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medicine is no longer sold), taking into account the time effect –in order to consider the decline in 
innovation in medicines as time passes. 
Note that, although both the EMA and the FDA also provide information for new generic drugs, which are 
a very important part of the pharmaceutical drugs picture [25], there were substantial differences between 
EMA generic authorizations and FDA generic authorizations. This is because the FDA considered many 
minor changes as new authorizations so these were not directly comparable to EMA generic authorizations. 
This final variable was devised from the initial variable ‘number of authorized innovative medicines’, with 
the aim of checking consistency in the results. After exploring several alternatives, the time effect –required 
for modeling the passing of time on the effect of an innovative medicine on company profits– was 
introduced by means of a mathematical function expressed in (2). Equation (3) represents the value of this 
variable for each medicine. Afterwards, the local results were added to obtain the global value of each 
laboratory. Note that ݐ� refers to the end of the period (31th  December 2013) or date of removal and ݐ଴ 
represents the date of authorization. After testing several alternatives, the parameters were set at the values ݇ଵ = Ͳ.ͲͲͲ6͵ʹʹͲ8 and ݇ଶ = Ͳ.Ͳͳ.  ݂ሺݐሻ = ͳ − ݇ଶሺ݁௞భሺ�−�బሻ − ͳሻ (2) ܰܦ��ܯܥܶܧ= ∫ [ͳ − ݇ଶ(݁௞భሺ�−�బሻ − ͳ)]݀ݐ = ∫ [ͳ − ݇ଶሺ݁௞భ∆� − ͳሻ]݀∆ݐ��−�బ଴ =���బ= [ሺͳ + ݇ଶሻ∆ݐ − ݇ଶ݇ଵ ݁௞భ∆�]଴��−�బ = ሺͳ + ݇ଶሻሺݐ� − ݐ଴ሻ − ݇ଶ݇ଵ ݁௞భሺ��−�బሻ + ݇ଶ݇ଵ 
 
(3)  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the seven variables considered for the database comprising 37 
pharmaceutical laboratories.  
******************************************************************* 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
******************************************************************* 
The dataset for the 37 pharmaceutical laboratories and the seven relevant variables (inputs and outputs) for 
the different DEA models are given in Tables B.1 and B.2 of Appendix B. 
2.4. Models. 
The iterative process followed led to the consideration of three models that are summarized in figure 2.  
******************************************************************* 
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
******************************************************************* 
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Model I only considers the six macroeconomic variables (three inputs and three outputs) explained above. 
Models II and III take into account the NDAIMCTE variable: model II as an input, and model III as an 
output. A double approach is adopted for this variable according to the following interesting interpretations: 
- NDAIMCTE can be understood as an input, because the more approvals of medicines the 
laboratory has, the more its outputs can be expected to improve (more sales, more net income, and 
more market value). That is to say, this approach considers that the authorization of a medicine 
makes sense only if reflected in these indicators. 
- NDAIMCTE can be considered an output, because the higher the inputs (the more employees the 
laboratory has, the bigger the investment, and the more investment in R&D), the more 
authorizations of medicines it can expect. In other words, if this variable is set as an output, the 
model measures how efficient the laboratory is in developing new products. This approach, which 
considers innovative medicines as an output indicator, highlights the importance of innovation in 
this sector.  
For the three models, we consider an output-oriented DEA model where there are as many objectives as 
output variables in each case- net profit, market capitalization and total sales –and the issue of new drugs 
in model II.  
It is also important to consider the relationship between the number of DMUs and the number of inputs and 
outputs in the model. Since the number of DMUs (37) is more than three times higher than the numbers of 
inputs and outputs (6 in model I, and 7 in models II and III), the Cooper et al. [17] criterion is verified, 
hence the models are appropriate. Regarding the Boussofiane et al. [8] criterion, satisfactory discrimination 
is obtained as the number of inputs is at least three times the number of inputs times the number of outputs 
(9 in model I, 12 in models II and III).  
Note that our iterative process led us to study different alternatives. Our first approaches were based on 
considering the NDAIMCTE as a core output in the study. However, when considering new authorized 
drugs, not all of them are equally innovative or equally successful. Innovation is difficult to measure, while 
success is difficult to predict. Researchers approach this problem in different ways. Kesselheim et al. [39] 
perform a systematic search for papers measuring drug innovation characteristics and compare different 
approaches. Light [42] evaluates drug innovation from 1982 to 2003 in three geographic areas (the US, 
Europe, and Japan) by calculating the “research productivity”, which is defined as the ratio of the number 
of new molecular entities (NMEs) to the amount of investment in R&D. 
One way to capture this future uncertainty about the success of a new drug is based on including market 
capitalization as an output. Analysts following large pharmaceutical firms will recommend buying or 
selling shares according to the pipeline and future prospects of existing and yet to be drugs. On the other 
hand, current success of chemical entities is captured by total sales and net income. In summary, these three 
outputs (market capitalization, total sales, and net profit) are good proxies to capture the innovation and 
success of authorized new drugs.  
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The use of these variables is a common approach. In their variable returns to scale DEA model, Shimura et 
al. [52] utilize three variables to evaluate R&D productivity (cumulative R&D expenses in the period 2002 
to 2007, number of new molecular entities and aggregate net present value). In our analysis we had to 
decide whether to include only new chemical entities or to include both new drugs and generic drugs. After 
analyzing both databases (EMA and FDA), we decided to exclude generic drugs because, at the FDA, minor 
changes (i.e. in the prospect or leaflet) were included for generic drugs while this was not the case at the 
EMA.  
 
3. DEA efficiency: Results and discussion. 
The main efficiency results of this research are reported in this section. It should be clarified that, as 
previously explained, we evaluated the efficiency of the 37 pharmaceutical firms only under the VRS 
assumption because the CRS model is not valid given the importance of scale effects in the pharmaceutical 
industry3.  
Table 2 reports the main results of models I, II, and III under the VRS assumption, in which the overall 
ranking is not influenced by the size of the company. The relative efficiencies of the 37 pharmaceutical 
laboratories are displayed. Note that, firstly, this table points out the companies that are relatively efficient 
in model I, and, secondly, their significant change rates (greater than 5% in model II) are highlighted in 
bold in models III and IV. Table 3 summarizes the main results.  
******************************************************************* 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
******************************************************************* 
Table 3 shows that average efficiency rises to 93.45% in model II, while the number of efficient companies 
amounts to 21. These are ABBOTT, AMGEN, ASTELLAS, BAYER, CELGENE, CELLTRION, CSL, 
EISAI, GILEAS GLAXOSMITHKLINE, HOSPIRA, JOHNSON & JOHNSON, MEDA AB, 
MEDICINES COMP., MERCK (KGAA), NOVO NORDISK, ORION, PFIZER, REGENERON, ROCHE 
and TEVA.  
******************************************************************* 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
******************************************************************* 
                                                          
3
 We thank one reviewer for this insight and suggestion. 
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From table 2, it is possible to see that –as expected– more companies are judged to be part of the efficient 
frontier in models II and III since the number of variables is greater, so efficiency is measured over more 
dimensions. 
When the NDAIMCTE variable is added to the model, average efficiency tends to increase, because the 
model is less discriminatory. Nonetheless, the increase is slight: 1.83% when it is considered an output, and 
1.59% when it is considered an input. The number of efficient firms increases to 25 in the first case, as ELI 
LILLLY, NOVARTIS, SHIRE, and TAKEDA become efficient. In the second case, the number of efficient 
laboratories increases to 22 as BIOGEN becomes a new member of the frontier.   
It must be highlighted that, given the slight change when the NDAIMCTE variable is considered either as 
an output (only five firms increase their efficiency more than 5%) or as an input (four firms in this case 
improve their efficiency more than 5%), the robustness of model I under the VRS assumption is verified. 
Thus, our study can be interpreted as a realistic approach for measuring efficiency in the pharmaceutical 
industry.  
Broadly speaking, the results provide evidence of the good position of pharmaceutical companies in terms 
of competitiveness in innovation. In model I, 31 out of the 37 companies analyzed in this study present a 
level of efficiency greater than 85%. In models II and III, this number increases to 32.  
Finally, table 4 presents the DEA-based analysis of peers for models II, III, and IV under the VRS 
assumption. The benchmark peers of each pharmaceutical company refer to the efficient laboratories that 
are taken as references to calculate their efficiency. Note that benchmark peers are ordered from the most 
influential to the least influential. Obviously, the most efficient companies do not have benchmark peers.  
******************************************************************* 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
******************************************************************* 
 
4. M&A activity and other financial transactions by pharmaceutical laboratories 
In the introduction, we have indicated that large pharmaceutical laboratories have two nonexclusive 
alternatives for managing their portfolio of new drugs and we have discussed previous contributions. 
Simultaneously, they may develop new drugs internally but they may also engage in mergers and 
acquisitions or other transactions to obtain new drugs or to change the composition of their portfolio of 
promising drugs (selling new drugs and buying other types of new drugs). 
In this section, we discuss, first, the direct effect of M&A activity among laboratories with drugs authorized 
by EMA and FDA during our study period and, second, the effect of large and smaller transactions. We 
analyze the effect of large merger and acquisition (M&A) activity (with direct effects on the number of new 
drugs authorized by EMA and FDA) in the pharmaceutical industry during the period 2008 to 2013 and its 
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potential effect on the estimated DEA relative efficiency of pharmaceutical laboratories. Some 
pharmaceutical laboratories acquire other innovative laboratories that have new chemical entity 
authorizations from the EMA and the FDA. If we restrict the mergers considered in [16] to those that 
occurred during our study period, there were four major mergers (Pfizer+Wyeth 2009, Novartis+Alcon 
2009, Roche+Genentech 2009 and Sanofi+Genzyme 2011) with acquirers from our sample of 37 
laboratories and targets with new drugs authorized by either FDA or EMA. After considering the four large 
successful M&As relevant for our research, eleven additional new chemical entities were included in the 
list of drugs authorized by EMA and FDA. 
We then re-estimated our DEA models, and found very small changes (or none at all) in the relative 
efficiencies of pharmaceutical laboratories. Table A.3 in the appendix describes new drugs authorized by 
EMA and FDA to laboratories that do not belong to our sample of 37 laboratories but to laboratories that 
have been acquired by, or have merged with, any of our 37 laboratories. 
In order to further address financial transactions by pharmaceutical labs, we also obtained much more 
detailed data on transactions announced by our 37 pharmaceutical laboratory sample in the period 2008-
2013. We provide two summary tables (transactions announced by year and by pharmaceutical lab) 
including information about all announced transactions from the S&P Capital IQ transactions database 
performed by our sample of 37 pharmaceutical laboratories during the period 2008-2013. In total, 2071 
transactions were announced by our sample of large pharmaceutical labs. Transactions include merger and 
acquisitions, private placements and Buybacks. 
******************************************************************* 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
******************************************************************* 
The total size of announced transactions during the study period for our sample of laboratories was 982,036 
million USD. Given that for some of the 2071 transactions the size was not reported, this is a conservative 
figure. 
******************************************************************* 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
******************************************************************* 
We split our sample in two. One subsample is made up of 21 efficient laboratories that are at the DEA 
frontier according to our DEA model I and the other is made up of the remaining 16 inefficient labs. Our 
sample of inefficient laboratories has an average efficiency of 84.8%. 
The size of the announced transaction was not available for all transactions (in smaller transactions some 
transaction details were not reported). Whenever this information was available, we used it to estimate the 
total size of these announced transactions for the two subsamples (efficient laboratories and inefficient 
labs). 
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We now make a simple comparison of these two subsamples. The total number of announced transactions 
is very similar in our two subsamples: 1,025 announced transactions by 21 efficient laboratories, and 1,046 
announced transactions by 16 inefficient laboratories. On average, each efficient laboratory made 48.8 
transaction announcements during our study period while each inefficient laboratory made 65.4. 
The average size of the announced transactions is higher for efficient laboratories (575,039 mm USD) than 
for inefficient laboratories (407,258 mm USD). 
 As a robustness check, we excluded Mitsubishi (an inefficient laboratory with 365 announced transactions) 
from the comparison given that this company is a conglomerate and some announced transactions are not 
directly related to the pharmaceutical sector. Once Mitsubishi is excluded, the total number of announced 
transactions is: 1,025 transactions by all efficient laboratories (as before) and only 681 transactions by all 
inefficient laboratories in our sample. On average, each efficient laboratory made 48.8 transaction 
announcements during our study period (as before), while on average each inefficient laboratory (excluding 
Mitsubishi) made 45.4. 
As an additional robustness test, we used yearly data on announced transactions during our study period to 
run two OLS regressions, see (5) and (6). The results are shown in table 7, see respectively OLS 1 and OLS 
2. �݊݊݋ݑ݊ܿ݁݀ ܶݎܽ݊ݏܽܿݐ݅݋݊ ܵ�ܼܧ௜�ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ �ݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜ = �଴ + �ଵ ∙ ܴ&ܦ௜ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ �ݏݏ݁ݐݏ ௜ + �ଶ ∙ ܧ݂݂݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕ௜  (5) �݊݊݋ݑ݊ܿ݁݀ ܶݎܽ݊ݏܽܿݐ݅݋݊ ܵ�ܼܧ௜�ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ �ݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜ = �଴ + �ଵ ∙ ܴ&ܦ௜ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ �ݏݏ݁ݐݏ ௜ + �ଶ ∙ ܧ݂݂݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜  (6)  
 
******************************************************************* 
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
******************************************************************* 
The dependent variable is the size of the total transactions per year per lab divided by average total assets 
of the lab during the study period. There are two independent variables: the ratio of R&D to total assets, 
and a measure of efficiency (either relative efficiency of each pharma lab during the whole study period or, 
alternatively, a dummy that takes value 1 when the pharma lab is at the frontier and zero otherwise). 
In both cases, our two OLS regressions show that both R&D/TA and Efficiency (or efficiency dummy) 
have a positive and significant impact on the number of announced transactions relative to total assets. That 
is to say, the labs that invest more in R&D and that have with higher DEA efficiency strike more deals 
(more announced transactions relative to the size of the lab measured as total assets). Relative Efficiency 
is significant at the 1.5% level and the efficiency dummy is significant at the 1% level. R&D relative to 
total assets is also significant at the 1% level in both OLS regressions. 
Given our study period and considering only 36 laboratories, in our two OLS regressions, efficient 
laboratories make on average more transaction announcements, and the relative size of each transaction 
18 
 
announcement is higher. Also, labs with more R&D relative to total assets strike more deals than labs with 
lower R&D relative to total assets. 
We ran two additional OLS regressions with an interaction term in each regression, see (7) and (8) 
corresponding to OLS 3 and OLS 4 in table 7.  �݊݊݋ݑ݊ܿ݁݀ ܶݎܽ݊ݏܽܿݐ݅݋݊ ܵ�ܼܧ௜�ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ �ݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜= �଴ + �ଵ ∙ ܴ&ܦ௜ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ �ݏݏ݁ݐݏ ௜ + �ଶ ∙ ܧ݂݂݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕ௜ + �ଷ ∙ ܴ&ܦ௜ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ �ݏݏ݁ݐݏ ௜ ∙ ܧ݂݂݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕ௜  
 
(7) 
�݊݊݋ݑ݊ܿ݁݀ ܶݎܽ݊ݏܽܿݐ݅݋݊ ܵ�ܼܧ௜�ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ �ݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜= �଴ + �ଵ ∙ ܴ&ܦ௜ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ �ݏݏ݁ݐݏ ௜ + �ଶ ∙ ܧ݂݂݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜ + �ଷ ∙ ܴ&ܦ௜ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ �ݏݏ݁ݐݏ ௜ ∙∙ ܧ݂݂݅ܿ݅݁݊ܿݕܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜ 
 
(8)  
After including the interaction term, results continued to be significant and positive for the estimates of β1 
and β2 and the estimate of the interaction term β3 is significant but negative. We interpret the results as 
follows.  
When we include the interaction term, the interpretation of this interaction term is that the labs that 
simultaneously are both more efficient and also invest more internally in R&D relative to total assets, 
announce smaller transactions relative to total assets of the lab (if you are very efficient and you invest 
more in R&D then you do not need so much to make more external acquisitions and other transactions). 
One concern when interpreting the results of our regression results would be that R&D/TA is a ratio variable 
made up of two variables that are also inputs in our DEA efficiency models. Thus, it is important to check 
if the two regressors (R&D/TA and Efficiency) are independent or not (if they are weakly or strongly 
correlated). If they were strongly correlated, our OLS results would be biased. We tried to assess whether 
R&D/TA and DEA efficiency (or DEA efficiency dummy) are independent of each other or not. First, we 
analyzed the correlation matrix of all the variables used in our four regressions. Also, we made two 
additional regressions (R&D/TA on DEA efficiency and R&D/TA on DEA efficiency dummy). The R 
square is 0.0022 in one case and 0.0409 in the other. Given these robustness checks, we conclude that the 
results obtained in our OLS models are valid and not biased. For reasons of space, we do not report the 
correlation matrix and the extra regressions although they are available upon request. 
 
5. Conclusions. 
This paper estimates the relative efficiency in the period 2008-2013 of 37 large pharmaceutical firms that 
received authorization for innovative medicines in the United States and/or the European Union within this 
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time period. Authorized drugs are concentrated in a small number of large and efficient pharmaceutical 
laboratories and it make sense for health authorities at the national level in the US (FDA) or at the European 
level (EMA) to discuss R&D strategies for the future with a small number of large laboratories. In addition, 
we analyze announced financial transactions by our sample of pharmaceutical laboratories as an alternative 
way to gain access to new drugs and new R&D. 
The novelty of our approach is that we considered 37 large laboratories from different countries in the 
period 2008 to 2013 and, simultaneously, we combined information from several different sources: 
Datastream financial and market information, EMA, and FDA drug approvals and announced financial 
transactions from Capital IQ. 
Although studies considering patents adjust for the quality of patents considering the number of times that 
a patent has been cited, in our case, only the most successful new drugs in the pharmaceutical pipeline are 
approved by EMA and FDA, so this measure is a better proxy for successful R&D. 
We used DEA non-parametric techniques, considering multiple inputs and outputs, and defined several 
dimensions in which large laboratories are considered to be efficient. While the inputs refer to different 
ways of measuring investment in the company, the outputs consider performance indicators. The relevance 
of R&D in this sector was also taken into special consideration. 21 companies proved to be efficient and 
16 inefficient when considering three inputs and three outputs under the VRS assumption. The average 
level of efficiency in the base model was 93.45%.  In addition, 10 companies are not efficient, but present 
a level of efficiency greater than 85%. Broadly speaking, this indicates the high competitive level of 
companies in this sector. 
Some previous papers estimate either DEA efficiency or DEA total factor productivity of pharmaceutical 
firms but most studies focus on a single country. Also, when measuring R&D efficiency, most previous 
papers consider the number of patents as a proxy for R&D. In this study, as a proxy for R&D we considered 
not only the number of new chemical entities approved by EMA and FDA for each laboratory but we also 
adjusted this figure considering the specific date of authorization of each new chemical entity. 
Shimura et al. [52] perform statistical analysis to explore links between R&D and industry consolidation in 
the period 2002 to 2007 considering a sample of 21 pharmaceutical laboratories. We, however, focus only 
on DEA estimates but consider more efficiency dimensions and we explore in detail peers at the frontier 
for the pharmaceutical laboratories that are not fully efficient. We perform an efficiency analysis without a 
DEA second stage approach given that DEA second stages are subject to some controversy as discussed 
above.  
We extend prior literature related to markets for technology and internal and external R&D strategy by 
considering in much more detail announced transactions and including not only a few very large M&As or 
a few hundred acquisitions but also many smaller transactions. 
Prior related contributions on acquisitions and innovation [3, 7, 16, 26, 31, 32, 38, 47, 52] focus on different 
characteristics of the acquirer and/or target and whether and how acquisitions create value. In our case, we 
20 
 
estimate first the relative efficiency of each pharma lab and then we introduce financial transactions into 
the analysis. Thus, we searched for further evidence of the link between lab efficiency and financial 
transactions in the pharmaceutical industry during our study period. Large M&As have been studied in 
previous papers but we contribute by analyzing in detail 2071 announced transactions by our sample of 37 
laboratories. Our sample is split in two. One subsample is made up of 21 efficient laboratories that are at 
the DEA frontier according to model I. The second subsample is made up of 16 inefficient firms. After 
adjusting for the market cap of each pharmaceutical laboratory (as a proxy for size), the transaction size 
relative to the size of the pharmaceutical laboratory is slightly larger for efficient laboratories (0.597) than 
for inefficient laboratories (0.530). 
Given our study period and considering only 36 laboratories (excluding Mitsubishi), efficient laboratories 
make on average more transaction announcements, and the relative size of each transaction announced is 
higher. Also, labs with more R&D relative to total assets strike more deals than labs with lower R&D 
relative to total assets. However, when we include the interaction term, this term suggests that labs that 
simultaneously are more efficient and also invest more internally in R&D announce smaller transactions 
relative to total assets of the lab. 
Although we think that new drugs authorized are a better proxy for successful research than patents, the 
authorization procedure is not perfect. New drugs submitted for authorization to EMA and FDA are subject 
to close scrutiny, especially during phase III. However, part of the results of the clinical trials is never 
published or is published with a considerable delay. Recent legislation tackles this problem. The USA 
passed legislation in 2007 and, in Europe, new legislation will come into force in 2016. The FDA has the 
power to fine laboratories that do not comply but it is reported that it has never actually done so [54].   
We propose several possible extensions of our paper. We did not consider information from laboratories 
with zero new drugs authorized during the study period. This was because of our DEA methodology for 
estimating efficiency as well as the fact that many laboratories had zero new drugs authorized in many of 
the years of our sample. However, different approaches and a different methodology may be able to exploit 
the data in order to further contribute to the subject. Censored regression models could be used to 
incorporate more pharmaceutical laboratories into the analysis and to consider many laboratories with zero 
drugs authorized. 
Alternatively, with an unbalanced data set, the use of panel data would be helpful in order to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity and to study the dynamics of the population. Pindado et al. [49] show how firm 
characteristics influence the relationship between R&D and firm value but, when constructing the 
unbalanced panel, they impose the restriction that there should be six consecutive years of information 
available from companies in the sample. This is only possible with a very large database comprising more 
sectors than the pharmaceutical sector. Another possible extension would be to estimate a two-stage DEA 
using, in the second stage, variables that were not used in the first stage. Explaining DEA inefficiency in a 
second stage analysis is a common practice for identifying factors whose impact on efficiency is statistically 
significant. However, the use of ordinary least squares, Tobit or other alternatives is subject to controversy, 
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as well as to limitations and biases according to recent papers. Simar and Wilson [53] compare the pros and 
cons of the different alternatives, but one alternative which is not subject to controversy is to incorporate 
all the relevant variables in the first step. This is what we did. 
In the case of EMA authorizations, there is authorization information since 1995 and, in the case of the 
FDA, there is information about new molecular entities since 1999 so this could be used to estimate changes 
in Total Factor Productivity adopting a DEA / Malmquist methodology in order to study the frontier shift, 
while also comparing relative efficiency and interpreting the individual evolution of companies. Another 
alternative would be to explore the differences between generics and new drugs authorized by EMA or 
FDA. 
Another alternative for future research would be to identify the sources and key factors of innovation of the 
different laboratories in different geographical regions. These factors may be identified at firm level or at 
country or regional level. In the latter case, factors such as the regulatory environment or approval times 
are important for pharmaceutical innovations –see e.g. [10, 20, 21]. Recently, Kinch [40] used information 
on FDA approved NMEs and merged this information with patent information. Grabowski and Wang [28] 
is another relevant paper on the subject that finds that biotech and orphan products enjoyed tremendous 
growth, especially for cancer treatment. Naci et al. [46] examined why the drug development pipeline is 
not delivering better medicines. Finally, it would be possible to explore in much more detail announced 
financial transactions in order to gain further insights regarding external R&D acquisitions.  
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Fig. 1. Internal and external R&D management of drug portfolio. 
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Fig. 2. Evaluation process of the laboratories’ efficiency. 
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Fig. 3. Overview of the three final models. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics for the database 
Variable Unit Average Min Max St. Dev. 
I1-SW employees 34,788.61 272.5 120,300.00 39,910.4 
I2-TA Million USD 33,521.3 106.7 176,414.2 41,399.7 
I3-IRD Million USD 2,601.5 0.6 9,092.6 2,743.6 
O1-NP Million USD 2,829.2 1.6 12,150.8 3,326.9 
O2-MC Million USD 44,847.0 136.7 190,890.1 49,688.5 
O3-TS Million USD 17,506.9 32.7 65,151.2 19,208.5 
I4/O4-NDAIMCTE Days 7,368.3 111.7 43,543.9 9,077.1 
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Table 2. Efficiency of the Pharmaceutical Laboratories using DEA (models I, II, and III): VRS assumption 
Company 
Model I Model II Model III 
Efficiency Efficiency 
Change 
rate 
Efficiency 
Change 
rate 
ABBOTT 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
ALLERGAN 86,30% 86,30% 0,00% 96,30% 10,00% 
AMGEN 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
ASTELLAS 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
ASTRAZENECA 95,20% 97,00% 1,80% 95,20% 0,00% 
BAYER 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
BIOGEN 88,20% 88,20% 0,00% 100,00% 11,80% 
BRISTOL 91,90% 95,20% 3,30% 91,90% 0,00% 
CELGENE 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
CELLTRION 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
CSL 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
EISAI 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
ELI LILLY 97,60% 100,00% 2,40% 97,60% 0,00% 
GILEAD 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
H. LUNDBECK 91,10% 91,10% 0,00% 91,20% 0,10% 
HOSPIRA 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
IPSEN 81,60% 81,60% 0,00% 83,30% 1,70% 
JOHNSON & JOHNS. 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
MEDA AB 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
MEDICINES COMP. 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
MERCK (KGAA) 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
MERCK & CO 82,80% 91,50% 8,70% 82,80% 0,00% 
MITSUBISHI 72,10% 72,10% 0,00% 93,60% 21,50% 
NOVARTIS 86,80% 100,00% 13,20% 86,80% 0,00% 
NOVO NORDISK 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
ORION 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
OTSUKA 95,10% 95,10% 0,00% 96,30% 1,20% 
PFIZER 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
REGENERON 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
RICHTER 70,20% 70,20% 0,00% 82,60% 12,40% 
ROCHE 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
SANOFI 75,00% 81,60% 6,60% 75,00% 0,00% 
SHIRE 97,60% 100,00% 2,40% 97,60% 0,00% 
TAKEDA 93,90% 100,00% 6,10% 93,90% 0,00% 
TEVA 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 
UCB 52,10% 75,40% 23,30% 52,10% 0,00% 
Note: The ‘Change rate’ columns show the number of companies whose improvement in efficiency is significant 
(greater than 5%). 
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Table 3. Summary of the results for models II, III, and IV under the VRS assumption 
Company 
Model I Model II Model III 
Efficiency Efficiency 
Change 
rate 
Efficiency 
Change 
rate 
Average 93.45% 95.28% 1.83% 95.03% 1.59% 
St Dev 11.02% 8.59% 4.64% 9.63% 4.61% 
Efficient firms  (*) 21 25 (5) 22 (4) 
Efficiency: [85%,100%) 10 7  10  
Efficiency: [70%,85%) 5 5  4  
Efficiency: [50%,70%) 1 0  1  
Efficiency: [0%,50%) 0 0  0  
Note: The ‘Change rate’ columns show the number of companies whose improvement in efficiency is significant (greater than 5%). 
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Table 4. Benchmark peers of each pharmaceutical laboratory (models I, II and III): VRS assumption 
Company Ref. Model I Model II Model III 
ABBOTT 1 1 1 1 
ALLERGAN 2 
 6-26-27-14  26-14-6-27 10-7-1-14-26-32 
AMGEN 3 3 3  3 
ASTELLAS 4 4  4  4 
ASTRAZENECA 5 32-26-19-14 32-16-19-14-26 26-32-14-19 
BAYER 6 6  6  6 
BIOGEN 7 26-12-14-21 26-21-12-14  7 
BRISTOL 8 14-32-3-19 35-14-15-32-19 14-3-19-32 
CELGENE 9 
 9  9  9 
CELLTRION 10 10 10 10 
CSL 11 11 11 11 
EISAI 12 12 12 12 
ELI LILLY 13 26-32-19-14 13 19-32-26-14 
GILEAD 14 14 14 14 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 15 15 15 15 
H. LUNDBECK 16 
 4-26-12-21  4-27-26-12-21 14-26-4-21 
HOSPIRA 17 17 17 17 
IPSEN 18 26-27-21 21-26-27 21-26-10-14 
JOHNSON & JOHNS. 19 19 19 19 
MEDA AB 20 20 20 20 
MEDICINES COMP. 21 21 21 21 
MERCK (KGAA) 22 22 22 22 
MERCK & CO 23 32-3-29-19 29-35-25-19  32-3-19-29 
MITSUBISHI 24 
 6-14-26-27 26-14-6-27 1-7-10-32 
NOVARTIS 25 14-19 25 14-19 
NOVO NORDISK 26 26 26 26 
ORION 27 27 27 27 
OTSUKA 28 14-32-26-6 14-32-6-26 26-14-10-6-32 
PFIZER 29 29 29 29 
REGENERON 30 30 30 30 
RICHTER 31 11-17-20-22 11-20-22-17 1-17-10-36-11 
ROCHE 32 32 32 32 
SANOFI 33 
 6-19-14 15-36-6-19 14-6-19 
SHIRE 34 14-12-26-21 34 14-12-26-21 
TAKEDA 35 14-3 -32 35 32-14-3 
TEVA 36 36 36 36 
UCB 37 
 6-14 -26 -27 25-34 26-6-27-14 
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Table 5. Transactions per year in the sample of 37 pharmaceutical laboratories 
Company 
Number of announced 
transactions 
Total  
accumulated size 
2008 346 154,762.56 
2009 335 211,270.56 
2010 338 159,756.12 
2011 339 218,567.56 
2012 369 106,518.07 
2013 344 131,421.59 
OVERALL 2,071 982,296.46 
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Table 6. Transactions per pharmaceutical laboratory in the period 2008-2013 
Company 
Number of announced 
transactions 
Total  
accumulated size 
ABBOTT 39 80,697.08 
ALLERGAN 20 3,032.35 
AMGEN 42 38,462.54 
ASTELLAS 47 8,434.67 
ASTRAZENECA 53 31,058.81 
BAYER 87 9,978.34 
BIOGEN 32 7,735.07 
BRISTOL 26 43,903.35 
CELGENE 43 23,724.35 
CELLTRION 8 156.41 
CSL 0 0 
EISAI 12 406.54 
ELI LILLY 64 25,353.78 
GILEAD 14 28,020.47 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 156 29,984.79 
H. LUNDBECK 18 1,767.05 
HOSPIRA 11 1,129.29 
IPSEN 24 4,743.54 
JOHNSON & JOHNS. 168 64,503.65 
MEDA AB 28 2,341.58 
MEDICINES COMP. 10 1,909.29 
MERCK (KGAA) 58 19,057.58 
MERCK & CO 74 79,208.71 
MITSUBISHI 365 42,644.27 
NOVARTIS 158 83,839.67 
NOVO NORDISK 28 11,698.79 
ORION 5 459.63 
OTSUKA 4 260.19 
PFIZER 112 159,115.88 
REGENERON 4 75.53 
RICHTER 22 1,104.19 
ROCHE 83 64,088.58 
SANOFI 87 43,349.41 
SHIRE 35 8,547.54 
TAKEDA 48 28,933.18 
TEVA 70 30,793.83 
UCB 16 1,776.53 
OVERALL 2,071 982,296.46 
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Table 7. Summary of the results of the regression models 
Explanatory variables OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 OLS 4 
R&D / Total Assets 
5.528*** 
(1.162) 
6.275*** 
(1.239) 
41.541** 
(16.272) 
10.010*** 
(1.915) 
DEA Efficiency 
1.107*** 
(0.320)  
4.149*** 
(1.207)  
DEA Efficiency Dummy  
0.255** 
(0.101)  
0.777*** 
(0.196) 
R&D / Total Assets *  
DEA Efficiency 
  
-37.464** 
(16.921)  
R&D / Total Assets * 
 DEA Efficiency Dummy 
   
-5.141** 
(2.441) 
Constant 
-0.690** 
(0.289) 
0.134 
(0.125) 
-3.620*** 
(1.169) 
-0.263 
(0.168) 
R-squared 0.159 0.163 0.190 0.183 
Number of observations 178 178 178 178 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A1. Datastream output measures. 37 laboratories versus 241 laboratories (data in million USD) 
Output 
Number of 
pharma labs 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Sum 2013 
O1-NP 37 87,018 113,048 100,980 109,562 107,580 108,967 
O1-NP 241 93,279 121,845 115,168 125,961 124,379 123,492 
Percentage 
- 93.3% 92.8% 87.7% 87.0% 86.5% 88.2% 
O2-MC 37 1,316,178 1,497,453 1,479,184 1,591,657 1,797,990 2,242,927 
O2-MC 241 1,465,046 1,693,558 1,742,159 1,856,308 2,181,790 2,823,773 
Percentage 
- 89.8% 88.4% 84.9% 85.7% 82.4% 79.4% 
O3-TS 37 543,044 602,776 673,175 685,712 692,554 676,711 
O3-TS 241 628,929 721,607 820,815 856,171 883,483 867,525 
Percentage 
- 86.3% 83.5% 82.0% 80.1% 78.4% 78.0% 
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Table A2. New drugs authorized by EMA and FDA in the period 2008 to 2013 without the effect of M&A 
Agency Year Number of Authorized Drugs Number of Days Number of Days Discounted 
EMA  2008 38 72,209 67,676 
EMA  2009 44 70,465 66,915 
EMA  2010 22 25,205 24,229 
EMA  2011 38 32,876 32,005 
EMA  2012 22 11,252 11,082 
EMA  2013 43 7,135 7,088 
FDA 2008 10 19,759 18,504 
FDA 2009 12 19,847 18,819 
FDA 2010 7 9,116 8,753 
FDA 2011 14 12,969 12,611 
FDA 2012 17 8,430 8,304 
FDA 2013 14 2,430 2,413 
EMA + FDA 2008 48 91,968 86,180 
EMA + FDA 2009 56 90,312 85,734 
EMA + FDA 2010 29 34,321 32,982 
EMA + FDA 2011 52 45,845 44,616 
EMA + FDA 2012 39 19,682 19,386 
EMA + FDA 2013 57 9,565 9,502 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
Table A3. New drugs authorized by EMA and FDA in the period 2008 to 2013 belonging to M&A 
Agency Year Number of Authorized Drugs Number of Days Number of Days Discounted 
EMA  2008 1 1,862 1,752 
EMA  2009 2 3,279 3,111 
EMA  2010 0 0 0 
EMA  2011 0 0 0 
EMA  2012 0 0 0 
EMA  2013 1 110 110 
FDA 2008 1 2,132 1,985 
FDA 2009 0 0 0 
FDA 2010 1 1,453 1,388 
FDA 2011 0 0 0 
FDA 2012 3 1,755 1,725 
FDA 2013 2 401 398 
EMA + FDA 2008 2 3,994 3,736 
EMA + FDA 2009 2 3,279 3,111 
EMA + FDA 2010 1 1,453 1,388 
EMA + FDA 2011 0 0 0 
EMA + FDA 2012 3 1,755 1,725 
EMA + FDA 2013 3 511 508 
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Table B1. Outputs for the DEA model 
Company Ref. 
O1 – NP (*) 
Net Income Basic 
O2 – MC (*) 
Market Capitalization 
O3 – TS (*) 
Net Sales 
O4 – NDAIMCTE (*) 
Number of days 
discounted until 
December 13 
ABBOTT 1 4,728,933 81,795 32,672,025 127 
ALLERGAN 2 703,150 23,442 5,225,333 1,205 
AMGEN 3 4,422,833 63,146 16,029,000 6,921 
ASTELLAS 4 1,312,290 20,471 11,049,964 6,924 
ASTRAZENECA 5 6,535,839 64,026 29,901,216 9,045 
BAYER 6 2,843,425 69,912 48,787,267 7,291 
BIOGEN 7 1,204,907 28,791 5,121,517 1,148 
BRISTOL 8 3,006,000 55,933 19,023,167 6,972 
CELGENE 9 724,639 35,263 4,233,646 6,347 
CELLTRION 10 1,560 137 32,695 112 
CSL 11 941,535 21,068 4,072,829 3,040 
EISAI 12 472,294 11,645 8,224,303 7,081 
ELI LILLY 13 3,407,917 48,338 22,548,833 7,129 
GILEAD 14 2,669,696 52,759 8,263,849 3,113 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 15 7,117,737 109,774 42,449,777 28,802 
H. LUNDBECK 16 310,826 3,818 2,607,541 2,614 
HOSPIRA 17 184,750 6,478 3,929,667 1,362 
IPSEN 18 121,484 3,282 1,543,927 1,616 
JOHNSON & JOHNS. 19 12,150,833 190,890 65,151,167  14,429 
MEDA AB 20 183,033 2,858 1,805,137 2,283 
MEDICINES COMP. 21 35,758 1,122 486,871 1,853 
MERCK (KGAA) 22 12,745 185 108,256 936 
MERCK & CO 23 6,391,050 112,088 39,450,600 24,469 
41 
 
MITSUBISHI 24 373,502 8,144 4,491,237 341 
NOVARTIS 25 9,307,241 162,456 53,173,503 43,544 
NOVO NORDISK 26 2,982,551 54,037 11,684,809 4,140 
ORION 27 247,665 1,056 1,184,442 2,549 
OTSUKA 28 924,146 15,321 12,549,824 3,174 
PFIZER 29 9,172,833 159,328 57,351,500 13,270 
REGENERON 30 116,311 9,003 834,308 3,810 
RICHTER 31 237,170 3,387 1,392,848 664 
ROCHE 32 9,703,329 30,595 48,172,073 5,838 
SANOFI 33 6,550,360 105,872 42,740,575 17,114 
SHIRE 34 586,697 16,201 3,844,582 6,694 
TAKEDA 35 2,669,367 36,543 16,746,817 19,833 
TEVA 36 2,015,502 41,540 16,822,439 6,186 
UCB 37 310,067 8,635 4,046,009 6,149 
* Datastream Data is in thousand USD for Net Income Basic and Net Sales, while market cap is in million USD.  
** The number of days discounted is computed for each pharmaceutical laboratory until December 2013. M&A activity only affected two pharmaceutical laboratories with authorized drugs in the period 2008 to 2013 
(Pfizer and Roche).  
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Table B2. Inputs for the DEA model 
Company Ref. 
I1 – SW (*) 
Employees 
I2 – TA (*) 
Total Assets 
I3 – IRD (*) 
Investment in R&D 
I4 – NDAIMCTE (**) 
Number of days 
discounted until 
December 13 
ABBOTT 1 80,500 52,395,697 3,153,094 127 
ALLERGAN 2 9,740 8,365,350 842,350 1,205 
AMGEN 3 17,883 48,142,000 3,234,833 6,921 
ASTELLAS 4 15,651 15,273,737 2,059,089 6,924 
ASTRAZENECA 5 58,200 52,071,173 4,231,109 9,045 
BAYER 6 110,650 68,614,409 3,982,957 7,291 
BIOGEN 7 5,350 9,361,089 1,267,042 1,148 
BRISTOL 8 28,833 32,178,833 3,507,500 6,972 
CELGENE 9 3,949 9,113,421 1,309,492 6,347 
CELLTRION 10 273 186,354 975 112 
CSL 11 10,303 5,279,541 306,281 3,040 
EISAI 12 10,977 11,545,267 1,808,208 7,081 
ELI LILLY 13 38,928 31,830,383 4,813,633 7,129 
GILEAD 14 4,159 14,730,257 1,291,045 3,113 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE 15 98,679 61,559,984 5,668,148 28,802 
H. LUNDBECK 16 5,582 3,400,398 503,502 2,614 
HOSPIRA 17 15,000 5,582,733 269,217 1,362 
IPSEN 18 4,518 1,953,324 306,635 1,616 
JOHNSON & JOHNS. 19 120,300 103,129,833 7,470,000 14,429 
MEDA AB 20 2,769 5,071,538 92,668 2,283 
MEDICINES COMP. 21 478 742,416 111,289 1,853 
MERCK (KGAA) 22 1,267 106,656 640 936 
MERCK & CO 23 82,367 96,384,650 6,901,817 24,469 
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MITSUBISHI 24 9,478 9,188,473 794,988 341 
NOVARTIS 25 117,179 107,311,781 8,699,227 43,544 
NOVO NORDISK 26 31,633 10,737,626 1,647,363 4,140 
ORION 27 3,320 1,075,103 122,836 2,549 
OTSUKA 28 24,526 17,422,894 1,828,382 3,174 
PFIZER 29 96,967 176,414,167 7,828,500 13,270 
REGENERON 30 1,556 1,405,310 143,325 3,810 
RICHTER 31 9,315 2,719,582 140,159 664 
ROCHE 32 81,886 65,889,688 9,092,583 5,838 
SANOFI 33 107,079 115,924,165 6,339,443 17,114 
SHIRE 34 4,631 5,896,458 743,059 6,694 
TAKEDA 35 22,336 35,046,990 3,610,550 19,833 
TEVA 36 41,617 41,970,743 1,075,776 6,186 
UCB 37 9,300 12,265,666 1,057,417 6,149 
* Datastream Data is in thousand USD for Total Assets and Investment in R&D, and for the other input is in number of employees. 
** Note this variable is used as both an input and an output. Again, the number of days discounted is computed for each pharmaceutical laboratory until December 2013. M&A activity only affected two pharmaceutical 
laboratories with authorized drugs in the period 2008 to 2013 (Pfizer and Roche).  
 
 
 
 
 
